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Is the 'rational actor' a Calhounian?
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Kreider, Clement H.. Is the 'rational actor' a Calhounian?. Retrieved from https://doi.org/doi:10.7282/T30C4TJH

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TitleIs the 'rational actor' a Calhounian?
NameKreider, Clement H. (author); McWilliams, Wilson Carey (chair); Barber, Benjamin R. (internal member); Bronner, Stephen Eric (internal member); Sandel, Michael J. (outside member); Rutgers University; Graduate School - New Brunswick
Date Created2012
Other Date2012-10 (degree)
SubjectPolitical Science, Rational choice theory, Social choice, Voting, Calhoun, John C.--(John Caldwell),--1782-1850--Political and social views
Extentvii, 228 p.
DescriptionRational or Social Choice Theory is a growing Nobel Prize-winning field which seeks to apply the formal methods of neoclassical or micro-economics to the study of voting. Perhaps the field’s most striking finding is that majority voting is “irrational”, or highly likely to issue in outcomes that are mathematically arbitrary and dictatorial or imposed, while laissez-faire or approximately unanimous decision (minority veto) are found to be “rational” and “optimal”. Diverse observers have noticed the distinct resemblance of such “rational actor” models to the political theory of John C. Calhoun, the American antebellum Southern Senator (the “Doctrine of the Concurrent Majority”). Using the usual methods of traditional political theory, my work uncovers a paper trail of citation and discussion of minority veto versus majority rule that goes back from Rational Choice Theory to one Knut Wicksell, the great turn of the 20th century Swedish economist, and from there through John Stuart Mill and Thomas Hare back to Calhoun himself. The results of Rational Choice Theory are revealed to come from inherited ideas rather than from formal logical or mathematical methods. This result in turn suggests significant consequences for the methodology of economics in general as well as for the resultant public policy proposals, such as the Social Choice-inspired Balanced Budget Amendments, which would restrict majority control over taxation and fiscal policy, and which have been under discussion in America and Europe since the 1980's
NotePh.D.
NoteIncludes bibliographical references
Noteby Clement H. Kreider, III
Genretheses, ETD doctoral
Persistent URLhttps://doi.org/doi:10.7282/T30C4TJH
Languageeng
CollectionGraduate School - New Brunswick Electronic Theses and Dissertations
Organization NameRutgers, The State University of New Jersey
RightsThe author owns the copyright to this work.
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